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Summary findings
In trying to explain institutional  quality, different  Second, "social" variables,  such as income inequality
authors have  come to conflicting conclusions.  In tackling  or ethnic diversity, are not associated with institutional
the problem themselves,  Islam  and Montenegro show  quality. The significance  of the inequality variable
three things.  disappears when continent dummy variables are included
First, openness is positively and pretty robustly  for Africa and Latin America.
associated with institutional  quality. To minimize  Third, features  of specific institutions,  such as freedom
selection bias, the authors use data sets with the greatest  of the press and checks and balances in the political
cross-country coverage, though they also test the  system,  are positively  associated with  overall perceptions
significance  of the variables for smaller sample  sizes. The  of institutional quality. These  findings hold strongly
results confirm that both natural and policy measures of  across different data sets and samples  even after the
openness are  important.  Concentration of trade in  authors control for the variables commonly used in the
natural resource exports continues  to be associated with  literature.
poor institutional  quality after openness  in trade is
accounted  for.
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It is  by now widely  accepted that factor accumulation  and technological  change  alone cannot
explain  differences  in  growth  performance  across countries  and that institutions  matter for  growth.
There  are several studies that associate institutional  quality with growth and even some that associate
institutional  quality  with  poverty  and  inequality.  These  studies  include both  cross  country analysis,
and historical  case studies.  The cross country studies generally focus  on indicators reflecting  overall
perceptions  of how well  governments  protect property  rights,  bureaucratic  quality,  the  power of the
rule of law, and the level of corruption (Knack  and Keefer,  1995,  Mauro,  1995, Hall and Jones,  1999,
Rodrik,  1999,  Acemoglu  et al  (2000),  Aaron (2000),  Dollar and  Kraay  (2000), Chong and  Calderon
(2000). There  are other studies with a less "macro" approach  which examine the relationship between
measures  of property  rights  (for example  the  existence  of land titles)  and output  or investment,  for
example,  Besley  (1995),  Johnson  et  al  (1999).  Studies  with  a  more  historical  bent  reflect  on  how
differences  in  institutions  over time  have  affected  economic  development  (Engerman  and  Sokoloff
(2000), North (1993,  1994) Jones (1981), Greif (1989).
Some  of  these  and  other  studies  also  examine  what  determines  different  aspects  of
institutional  quality  itself.  The  struggles  of  many  poor  countries  around  the  world  and  the
experiences of the former Soviet Union  countries  illustrates how much time institution building takes,
and the interdependencies  of political,  geographic,  social and economic factors.  The studies recognize
the importance  of history  and  initial conditions  in affecting  subsequent  development.  They  illustrate
the  interdependence  of various  factors  in  affecting  institutional  quality.  Engerman  and  Sokoloff
(2000)  for  example,  examine  the  implications  of endowments  and  inequalities  for the  differential
development  of institutions  favouring  growth  in  North  and  South America.  Acemoglu  et al  (2000)
consider  the effects  of climate  and  related  factors  on settlements  in various  regions  of the world to
explain  the quality of institutions  in these  lands  and  subsequent  growth.  Studies also control  for the
2years a country has been independent  as a measure of the time it takes to build strong  institutions of
the state.  Many developing  countries became  nation  states only in the mid 1900s- giving them 50-60
years of independence.  In institution building terms this is by no means a long time.
It might also be that colonial leaders from different  European origins had distinct approaches
to their colonies.  For example,  in some colonies,  all domestic enterprise  which competed with those
of the colonizing  power were destroyed.  This for example,  is the case of Senegal  under the French  in
the  18t" century.  While  these  qualitative  differences  are  not easy to  test empirically,  the effect  of
different legal origins,  representative  of the political and social forces  in different colonisers has been
tested.
La Porta et al (2000),  Straub (2000), and Chong and Zanforlin (2000), Demirguc-Kunt  et al,
2001)  are among those who test the impact of legal origin on institutional  development.  In particular,
these  papers  find  that  countries  with  French  legal  heritage  have  consistently  poorer  institutional
quality that those  with  other  legal traditions.  It  is  argued  that French  civil  law countries  have  been
characterized  by  a more  interventionist  and  formal government  apparatus,  and  a legal  system which
has historically  left less  policy  making power  in the hands of independent  and autonomous  agencies
such  as  the  judiciary.  The  common  law  system,  traditionally  viewed  as  flexible  and  dynamic
underwent a different political process which meant more judicial independence.
Ades and  di  Tella (1999),  Treisman  (1998  /9), Gatti  (1999),  Djankov  et al (2000) consider
how the presence of rent seeking  opportunities and lack of competition - provided by a proliferation
of regulations, or, alternatively, the presence of natural resources,  may affect corruption.
Papers by Wei (2000), Laffont and Guessan (1999) look at how openness  affects corruption.
However,  Knack and Azfar,  (2000) find that the results relating to openness are very sensitive to the
choice and number of countries. Using data sets larger than those used by other authors, they find that
these results  disappear.  This paper however  shows that  the results hold  even when  using the  largest
available (and two different) datasets.
3Historical  case  studies  argue  that  competition  reduces  rents  and  therefore  improves  the
quality  of institutions,  often  by reducing  opposition  to  change;  this  is the  case  made  for  financial
development  (Rajan  and Zingales,  2000),  and Beck et  al (2000).  For the evolution  of corporate  law,
Pistor et al, (2000)  argue that competition between  states has been a key factor promoting change.
Why  should  more  open  economies  have  better  institutions?  In  more  competitive  contexts
economic  agents  with  poor  institutions  fare  worse  than  those  with  better  institutions  and  so  have
incentives  to  change their  institutions.  Second,  rent  seeking  and corruption  is  harder  when  there  is
competition  among  agents.  Third,  as the number  of trading partners  increases,  better institutions are
demanded  to  manage  risk that  comes  from  trading with  unknown  partners.  Greater  risk and  greater
opportunities  work  together  to  break  the  effectiveness  of existing  networks  and  rules  and  create
demand  for  more  effective  institutions.  Fourth,  agents  in open  economies  learn  from those  in  other
economies  and  these  forces  work  to  improve  institutional  quality.  Foreign  or domestic  businesses
lobby  governments  for  change-  as  evidenced  by  Mexican  banks  which  lobbied  for  better  banking
regulation  following the signing of NAFTA.'  For all these  reasons, better quality  institutions can  be
expected to evolve faster in more open economies.
The  paper also  considers  the effect  of social factors  such as ethnic  compositions  or income
inequality.  La Porta et al (1999)  find that ethnic  heterogeneity  is associated  with poorer institutional
quality.  Chong  and  Calderon  (2000)  discuss  the  opposite  causality  that  income  inequality  can  be
explained by institutional  quality and that the effect  is nonlinear.
The argument that polarisation  in society  may be associated  with worse  outcomes in terms of
institutional  development  mirrors  the  arguments  made  for  the  effect  of  polarisation  on  policy
outcomes  (Alesina,  Baqir  and  Easterly  1999).  Individuals  that  identify  themselves  strongly  with
particular  groups  in society and in  some way "against" other groups in  society are less  likely to agree
on  policies  or  demand  institutions  which  disproportionately  benefit  other  groups.  For  example,
4linguistically  distinct groups would have different preferences  for the language used in schools. Even
if they agree  on a common language,  they may value schooling less than they would if it were taught
in  their  ethnic  tongue  (Easterly,  2000).  Similarly,  groups  from  different  income  classes  could have
quite divergent interests in terms of the institutions which they feel serve their interests.  For example,
in a market  which is dominated by a few large  firms and  large banks, credit  is often extended on the
basis  of reputation  and  social  connections.  These relationships  are  often developed  over  time. New
entrants  may  face difficulties  accessing  credit.  Institutional  development,  for  example,  formal  laws
and  regulations  that delineate  and  enforce  creditors'  rights  (such  as collateral  law),  and  that help
provide  credible  information  on  potential  borrowers,  can  facilitate  access  to  credit.  However,
incumbents,  older,  often  larger, established  firms,  do not have incentives  to  increase  competition  in
the market for funds.
This  paper attempts to  sort through  all these stories.  It  uses newer and  larger data sets than
those  used in many of the papers discussed  above and tests for the significance of key variables over
many different  sample selections.  Many of the earlier papers have found  associations  which  depend
on  the  exclusion  or  inclusion  of particular  variables.  What  we  find  of particular  interest  is  that
openness  in  trade  holds  up  as  being  a stable  and  significant  factor  affecting  economic  aspects  of
institutional  quality (rather than those related to voice and accountability);  both policy and exogenous
factors  seem to be relevant.  Also  interesting  is the nature of the association  between social  structure
and  institutional  quality: contrary to the findings of La Porta  et al (1999)  ethnic diversity appears to
have  no  relationship  with  institutional  quality  once  other  factors  are  accounted  for.  The  negative
association  found  between  income inequality  and  institutional  quality (Chong  and  Calderon,  2000)
breaks down  when regional  effects  are  included- that is when continent dummies  for Latin America
and Africa are included.
1 WDR 2002, Building Institutions  for Markets.
5Another question is  how features  of particular  institutions, for  example, checks and balances
between  the  executive,  legislative  and  judicial  branches  of the  government,  may  affect  overall
institutional  quality  (Djankov et al,  2001  measure the association  between  autocracy  and institutional
quality).  The  existence  of check  and  balances  constrains  political  changes to  a certain  degree  and
therefore  may  be  expected  to  enhance  stability  or  regulatory  commitment  and  thus  improve
perceptions  of institutional  quality.  Second, institutional  constraints  may lead to a government that is
less  concerned  with  political  redistribution  of benefits  and  more  concerned  with  enhancing  the
environment  for  economic  activities.  But,  at  the  same  time,  the  existence  of strong  checks  and
balances may lead to excessive rigidity  in  institutions (Gaviria et al., 2000).
Similarly,  institutions  which  process  information  can  affect  others;  thus  we  examine  how
freedom  of the media affects  overall  institutional  quality  or governance.  A free  media and access to
information  allows market  participants  to provide checks  and balances on each  others'  activities  and
on government  activities  (Djankov et al., 2001).  This paper  builds on recent cross country empirical
work which assesses the impact of a particular  institutional feature that is, media ownership  on overall
institutional  quality in the presence of other "traditional"  factors.2
Both a higher number of checks and balances on government and a free press are important in
determining  overall  institutional  quality.  However,  state ownership  of the press  is not significantly
associated  with  indicators  of institutional  quality,  contrary  to the  findings  of Djankov  et al  (2001)
once we account for legal origin and other factors. Though causality is not established, in theory there
are effects  in both  directions: for example,  better governments are more likely to have a free press on
average  and  a  free  press  is  more  likely  to  produce  better  governments.  However,  lack  of  an
appropriate instrument, precluded  further analysis.
2 In this regard, the existence of organizations  such as an independent media can have consequences  for the way
other institutions functions. A free media affects the incentives of both public and private agents and
therefore economic  outcomes. (references).  But it may also be that countries with well functioning
institutions are also those which have independent media with a third variable  driving both.
6The empirical results are discussed below.
II. DATA
Two different sources of governance  indicators  are  used for the analysis.  These were chosen
for the large number of data points that they offer.  The first set of measures of institutional  quality is
compiled  by the  International  Country  Risk  Guide  (ICRG)  and  includes  135  countries  from  1982
onwards. The ICRG indices used in this paper are Corruption in Govemment,  Rule of Law, Quality of
the Bureaucracy,  Repudiation of Contracts,  and Risk of Expropriation. 3 Following  Knack and Keefer
(1995)  and Chong and Zanforlin (2000), we defined the ICRG overall index as the simple average  of
the five individual measures re-scaled from zero to six (six meaning better quality of institutions).
Our second set of governance  indicators come from two recent papers (Kaufmann, Kraay and
Zoido-Lobaton,  1999a,  1999b)  which take the view that many of the existing  institutional  indicators
serve  as  imperfect  proxies  for  a much  smaller  number of fundamental  concepts  of governance  or
institutional  quality.  These  authors  group  31  indicators  constructed  in  1997/1998  into  six clusters
corresponding  to  three  concepts  of governance:  rule  of law,  government  effectiveness,  regulatory
burden,  graft, voice and accountability and political instability and violence. The indicator "Voice and
Accountability"  measures  the extent and to which citizens of a country  are able to participate  in the
selection  of governments.  "Political  Instability and  Violence"  measures  the likelihood  of wrenching
changes  in  government.  The  second  group  deals  with  the capacity  of the  state to implement sound
policies.  The  two indicators  in this group are "Government Effectiveness"-  the ability of government
to produce  and  implement  good  policies- and  "Regulatory  Burden"  -an  index of the quality  of the
policies governments  implement. The  last group deals with the respect of the state and the citizens for
the  rules. The  two indicators  in this case are "Rule of Law" (it measures  the success  of a society in
developing an environment  in which fair and predictable rules  form the basis for economic  and social
7interactions)  and  "Graft"  (it  measures  perceptions  of corruption).  The main  focus  of this  paper are
those indicators  of institutional  quality that  related  to government  effectiveness,  corruption  and the
rule of law,  rather than  on voice and political  outcomes.  We  rescale all the indicators  so that higher
values  indicate  better  outcomes.  The  second  set  of  indicators  are  only  available  for  the  years
1997/1998.
A  problem  noted  recently  (Straub,  2000),  is that the results  from the regressions  explaining
institutional  quality  are  highly sensitive to  the  selection of the  left-hand  side variable.  Our analysis
looks at several different  left hand side variables.
In terms of independent  variables,  the two variables which  indicate  social characteristics  are
ethnic  heterogeneity  and  income  inequality.  We use  the Taylor  and  Hudson (1972)  ethnolinguistic
fractionalization  index defined as:
(2
ELF  =  1-E(NI
i=1 N)
where i represents different ethno-linguistic  groups in the society, i is the total number of such groups,
and N is the total population. The  index measures  the probability that two randomly selected  person
from the population will not belong to the same ethnolinguistic  group.
In terms of the measure of inequality,  we use the Gini coefficient  from the database  compiled
by Lundberg  and Squire (1999).  This  database represents  an exhaustive collection  of Gini  indices for
many countries  at different points in time. For each  country we picked the observation that provided
the  most reliable  estimates  of inequality,  as judged  by  the  authors.  In  some  countries  which  were
missing such indicators, we picked the nationally representative,  most recent observation. The data for
all  the  Ginis  included  represent  periods  predating  the  period  over which the  analysis  is  conducted.
3 For a more detailed description of the measures see Knack and Keefer (1995).
8This is done  in order to reduce, to some extent, the endogeneity problem since better institutions may
influence the level of inequality.4
We  distinguish  between  the  English,  French,  Scandinavian,  German  and  Socialist  legal
origins. Our data come from "Foreign  Laws:  Current Sources of Basic Legislation  in Jurisdictions  of
the World",  1989; and CIA World Factbook 1996.
GDP  per  capita  can  be  expected  to  have  strong  effects  on  subsequent  development  of
institutions since presumably with higher income there is both a greater demand for better institutions
and also because richer countries can afford better  institutions. But it has also been shown that better
institutional  quality can lead to higher output levels (KKZ) and higher growth.  To partially avoid this
problem,  our measure  of income per capita corresponds  to the average  income for the period  1990-
1994,  i.e.,  before  the  period  under  consideration.  This data  is  taken  from  the  World  Bank dataset,
SIMA information system.
To measure openness  we use the sum of imports plus exports over GDP. The data come from
the World Bank (SIMA data set).  The variable is an average  for the years  1997 and  1998.  While it is
hypothesized  that greater openness  increases  the demand  for and  supply of better institutions,  it may
also  be  that  countries  with  better  governance/institutions  are  more  likely  to be  open.  In  order  to
correct for possible simultaneity problems,  we use 2SLS using size and geography variables.  We also
test for policy measures of openness-  specifically average  tariff rates. The average tariffs correspond
to an average  of the period  1990-1998  fo the "Tariff Rates  for Developing  and Industrial  Countries
(unweighted and in %)"  from a World Bank data source.5
4  For a few countries the gini selected is more that three decades old. The data set used is from Lundberg and
Squire (1999),  but we imposed the additional condition that it had be from a national survey (that is not for
a specific locality within the country)  and also had to be classified by the authors as a "good quality" gini.
In this selection some arbitrariness may have been introduced.
5Trade data are from the Trade Policy Group, Development Economics,  World Bank.
9Based on a recent paper which examines  the effect of an independent media on  institutional
quality  (Djankov  et al., 2001)  and  finds  that  ownership  of the  media  (public  versus  private)  is  a
significant determinant of media  freedom, we use the percentage  of state ownership of the press as an
explanatory  variable  for  institutional  quality.  We  also use  freedom  of the  press data from  Freedom
House, as an explanatory variable.
The index of checks and balances used in this paper was devised by Henisz (2000). The  index
is  based  on  a  spatial  model  of political  interaction  among  government  branches.  It measures  the
number of independent branches  with power and the distribution  of political preferences  across these
branches  and  is  calculated  annually.  A  zero  value  means  no  checks  and balances.  A value  of one
indicates  that the  executive  enjoys  relatively  unchecked  power.  An average  of the  index  over  the
period  1990 to 1994  is used.
Finally  we  test  for  how  opportunities  for  rent  seeking  may  lead  to  lower  quality  of
institutions  by allowing  more rent seeking opportunities.  To  do this we use the  Sachs-Warner  index
of openness which  is sometimes  thought to  be a better representation of policy distortions leading  to
rent  seeking  opportunities  than  of openness.  We  also  use  the  proportion  of primary  commodity
exports  (fuels and  minerals)  relative  to overall  exports.  These data  are  from the UN's COMTRADE
data base, years 96-97 for the regressions using the KKZ variables and years  84-97 for the regressions
using the ICRG variables.
III. EMPIRICAL APPROACH
Given our previous discussion,  the basic model to be tested  is:
INDEX  =  a+)I3*ethnolin +  132*socialist  +/33*french  +,84*german
+ #,3  *  scandinavian +  136 * PPPgnp +  f3l,  *  independent
+/3#,*openness +,3 9*gini  +/3, 10*fpress  +,611 *c&b  + ,u
10Where INDEX is our measure of the quality of the institutions; ethnolin is the ethnolinguistic
fractionalization  index;  socialist,  french, german, and scandinavian are dummy  variables  indicating
dhe legal origin of the commercial code; PPPgnp  is the natural  log of the average  GNP; independent is
the  log of the number of years the country has been  independent;  openness is an average of imports
plus  exports  as  a proportion  of GDP; gini is the  gini coefficient  taken  from  Lundberg  and  Squire
(1999),  as  explained  in the previous  section; fpress is an  indicator of the  freedom of the press; and
c&b is  a measure of the checks  and balances  existing at the political  level of the government.  Other
explanatory variables  such as checks and balances on government (c&b), the Sachs and Warner index,
the prevalence  of minerals and fuels in total exports and state ownership of the press are added to the
basic specification  in turn.
Table  1 presents  general  statistics  for  the  variables  used.  Table  2  presents  the  correlation
matrix for the  explanatory  variables.  The same  model specification  is used for each  measure of the
quality of institutions.  The KKZ  indices have the advantage  of covering  several  more countries  than
the ICRG index. On average the number of observations are about  100 with the former and around 80
with the latter.
Openness Results
These  results  are  shown  in  Tables  3(a  and  b)  and  4(a and  b)  for the  KKZ variables  and  in
tables  5(a and  b)  and  6(a  and  b)  for  the  ICRG  variables.  They  show  that openness  to trade  is a
significant  determinant  of institutional  quality,  though  not for  those  measures  related  to voice  and
accountability  or political  instability.  The  instrument  for the openness  variable  comes  from  Frankel
and  Romer  (1999).  These  authors,  using  a  trade  gravity  equation,  compiled  an  instrument  for
openness  that  is  based  on  geographic  variables  (countries'  sizes, their  distances  from  one  another,
whether  they  share  a  common  border,  and  whether  they  are  landlocked),  and  on  countries'
populations. Using the gravity model, the authors estimate for each country the geographic componentof countries'  total trade.  This  estimate  is unlikely  to be correlated  with factors that affect the quality
of institutions.  In other words,  it is difficult to think of reasons that geographic  isolation can affect the
quality of institutions other than by reducing  its interactions with other countries. 6
In the  specifications  which use the ICRG  index,  openness  is generally  significant  (except in
the case of bureaucratic quality). This  is also the case for the KKZ indices which measure government
effectiveness,  the  rule  of  law  and  graft.  These  results  hold  over  various  specifications  with
significance  at the 5%  significance  level.  As a test of whether only the  geographical  determinants  of
openness  affect  institutional  quality,  a  measure  of tariff distortions  was  added  as  a right  hand  side
variable.  Table  7  shows  these  results.  They  indicate  that  high  tariffs  are  associated  with  poor
institutional  quality  (though  the causality  may run  in  both  directions).  When the  openness  variable
(2SLS)  is  included  with  the  tariff measure  (Table  8)  the  latter  becomes  less  significant  though  it
remains significant  in most of the specifications  in which  it was previously significant.
Trade  related distortions
When the  Sachs-Warner  index  of openness  is used  instead,  it is  also found to be positively
associated with institutional  quality as shown  in Table 9. However,  as noted earlier the Sachs-Warner
index  may be taken  more  as a  measure of regulatory  distortions or opportunities  for rent-seeking.  A
higher  ratio  of primary  exports  relative  to  total  exports  is  also  associated  with  poorer  institutional
quality-  again  possibly reflecting  the association  between  rent  seeking opportunities and  institutional
quality.
Social structure and inequalitv
The  Gini  coefficient  enters  with a negative  sign  in all  the estimates.  Using the KKZ  indices
the variable  is  significant at the  5%  level  for rule of law, graft,  government  effectiveness  as well  as
political  instability.  For  the  ICRG  indices,  it  is  significantly  important  for most  of the  individual
6 In the first stage regression we see that the coefficient of the instrument  is significantly different
from zero at the 1%  level of confidence.  Accordingly,  the Hausman's test is applied to test for
12measures  of institutional  quality.  However, the inclusion  of dummies  for Latin America and Africa,
particularly the  former,  reduces or cancels  the significance  of the gini  coefficient.  Generally  higher
measured  inequality  in  these two  regions  seems to  account  for  the  significance  of the  association
between  the  gini  coefficient  and  institutional  quality.  This  is  true  even  when  different  non-linear
specifications  of the relationship are tested,  unlike the results found elsewhere  (Calderon and Chong,
2000).
Interestingly,  the  measure  of ethno-linguistic  fractionalization  is  not  generally  correlated
significantly with institutional  quality unlike  the results found  in La Porta et al (1999). In theory, the
association  between  ethnic fragmentation  and institutional  development  can  in theory be positive or
negative.  Countries with strong state institutions may be able to counter ethnic tensions and maintain
ethnically  heterogenous  populations.  This  would  lead  to  a  positive  association  with  institutional
quality. Or, equally likely, countries with low ethnic  fragmentation  may be better able to build strong
institutions  and  strong  states. This  impies a negative  association  between  diversity and  institutional
quality.  It may  also  be that  countries  that  have  survived  as  states  have  done  so  because  ethnic
communities were destroyed.  So strong institutions could be associated with low ethnic diversity.
Consistent  with  other  papers  on  the topic,  countries  with  French  legal  origin  seem to  do
consistently  worse than others  (the socialist legal code  is not always significant),  how long a country
has been important matters for institutional development,  as does of course GNP per capita.
Particular features of institutions
Inclusion of the variable measuring the extent of checks and balances in government does not
affect the  main conclusions.  Using the ICRG  index,  it is significant for all measures of institutional
quality:  more checks  and  balances means  better  institutions.  For the  KKZ  variables  it is significant
only for variables  such as voice and accountability  and political  instability but not significant for the
others.
endogeneity in each case.
13Another  conclusion  is  that freedom  of the press  is  significantly  associated with  the
institutional  quality variables  affecting  also voice and accountability  measures  of institutional quality
as well (Table  6).  Djankov et al (2001) contend that state ownership of the press affects  institutional
quality.  Using state ownership of the press  as an explanatory  variable, we find that it is  generally not
significant  in  our  specifications  which  control  for  legal  origin  and  social  structure.  In  some of the
regressions using the KKZ  variables,  measures of voice  and accountability  and the regulatory  burden
imposed  by  governments  are  negatively  associated  with  state  ownership  of the  press.  It  is  not
significant for any of the ICRG indicators (Table  10).
The  results we  obtain with respect to openness,  social  structure and freedom  of the press  are
maintained through different  specifications.  They  are maintained  in different  samples, to inclusion of
various  regions,  or elimination  of different  variables.  They also hold when the sample  is divided into
smaller subsamples according to income. All these results are not presented here.
V. CONCLUSIONS
What are  the interesting conclusions  from this work?  Theory suggests  that many factors  are
responsible for determining  institutional  quality.  In this paper we revisit the issue empirically.  Using
datasets  with the  greatest  cross  country  coverage.  The  KKZ  indices  have  the  advantage  that they
aggregate  information  from various  sources  and  probably  contain  less  measurement  error than  the
ICRG  index.  The  ICRG  indices  are  always  available  for  a  relatively  large  sample of countries  and
have the added advantage  that they  are  available  for several  years.  We find that openness  in trade  is
significantly  and consistently  correlated with measures  of institutional quality that focus on economic
features  such  as  the  rule  of  law,  corruption,  and  government  effectiveness  measures.  Evidence
indiciates  that  policy  measures  affecting  openness  are  important.  Open  trade  does not  seem  to  be
important  for measures  of institutional  quality  which  focus on  political aspects  or voice.  Second,  in
contrast  to  what  has  been  found  previously,  ethnic  diversity  has  no correlation  with  institutional
quality.  The  negative  association  between  income  inequality  and  institutional  quality  that  has
14previously  been  found  in the literature  disappear  when  continent dummies  for Latin  American  and
Africa are  included.  In  one  sense  the lack  of association  between  social  structure  and  institutional
quality gives us hope: there seems to be no reason to suspect that institutional quality may be fated to
be worse in ethnically diverse  countries than in countries  with more  homogenous populations.  Also,
initial inequality  of income does not seem to have any association with institutional quality once other
factors  are accounted  for.  The  Engerman-Sokoloff hypothesis  of high  inequalities  leading to poorer
institutional  quality in  South American  relative  to North America may not be a more  general  one -
only in regions  with very high  inequalities  (such  as in parts of Latin America and Africa)  might this
effect be significant.
Finally  features  of particular  institutions  can  have  consequences  for  overall  perceptions  of
institutional  quality.  Measures  of  checks  and  balances  in  the  political  system,  seem  to  affect
significantly  both  voice  and political  measures  of overall  institutional  quality.  A  free press  affects
other  features  of institutional  quality,  such  as  how  effective  a government  is.  However,  unlike the
results  obtained  in  Djankov  et  al  (2001),  state  ownership  of  the  press  is  not  significantly  and
negatively  correlated with institutional quality except for selected  measures. Finally,  as found in other
papers,  countries from the French  legal system seem to have  significantly poorer institutional  quality.
Regulatory  distortions  and  the  presence  of rent  seeking  opportunities  in  trade  is  associated  with
inferior institutional quality.
Finally,  the  lack  of suitable  instruments  has  limited  some  of the  analysis.  To  the  extent
possible, we have used values of right hand side variables for several  years preceding the period under
study in order to  understand, to the extent possible, the effect of the right hand side variables  on the
dependent  variables.
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17Variable  |  Mean  |  Median  |SdDe.  |Minimum  |  Maximum  |Skewness  |  Kurtosis  |  Obs.
Voice  -048  -0.0759  0.9613  -1.7886  1.6936  0 0978  1,9287  172
Pinstab  -0.0229  0.0080  0.9389  -2.5863  1.6904  -0.3241  2.5675  154
Geffect  -0.0143  -0.1379  0.8962  -1.8831  2.0821  0.3971  2.6069  155
Regbrdn  0.0007  0.1835  0.8323  -3.1421  1.2447  -0.8997  3.6820  165
rlaw2m  0.0034  -0.1399  0.9293  -2.1525  1T.9958  0.2706  0.2136  165
Graft  0.0001  -0.2528  0.9089  -1.5668  2,1290  0.7787  2.7436  _  154
icrg97  4.2568  4.2400  1.0276  1.2000  6.0000  -0.3927  3.1490  19
corup97  3.2976  3.0000  1.2709  0.0000  6.0000  0.0656  2.7736  129
lawrul97  4.2573  4.0000  1.2856  1.0000  6.0000  -0.2278  2.2281  129
bureau97  3.5077  3.0000  1.9519  1.0000  6.0000  0.3650  3.1172  129
cntcre97  4.8130  5.3400  1.1680  0.6000  6.0000  -1.3172  4.5100  129
expris97  5.4083  5.7000  0.8925  1.8000  6.0000  -2.1352  7.5802  129
Icrg 84-97  3.7010  3.4668  1.1477  1.2940  5.9678  0.3977  2.4381  135
Corup 84-97  3.3814  3.1000  1.3127  0.1187  6.0125  0.2784  2.5487  135
Lawrule 84-97  3.4671  3.2928  1.4352  0.9187  6.0000  0.3404  2.0444  135
Bureau  84-97  3.2563  3.0000  0.4530  0.9062  6.0000  0.5025  2.3596  135
Cntcrepu  84-97  3.8845  3.7725  1 .1477  1.2300  6.0000  0.1235  2.2363  135
Ex prisk 84-97  4.2919  4.2375  1.0675  1.4400  6.0000  -0.1941  2.4070  135
Independent Variables
Avelf  0.3449  0.2625  0.3027  0.0000  1.0000  0.4256  1.6692  156
legor  so  0.1707  0.0000  0.3771  0.0000  1.0000  1.7501  4.0630  205
legor  fr  0.4390  0.0000  0.4974  0.0000  1.0000  0.2457  1.0603  205
legor  ge  0.0341  0.0000  0.1820  0.0000  1.0000  5.1304  27.3210  205
legor  sc  0.0243  0.0000  0.1546  0.0000  1.0000  6.1664  39.0250  205
gnpp9l95  8.2352  8.2267  1.0634  6.0067  10.2662  0.0212  2.0360  147
gnpp7680  7.1133  7.0825  0.8784  5.5911  9.4691  0.2601  2.3668  110
Indep  3.8200  3.6109  1.1487  1.3862  5.6937  -0.1416  2.4084  188
ops9798  0.8454  0.7502  0.4747  0.1763  3.0144  1.5086  6.4245  160
ops8497  0.7519  0.6336  0.4941  0.1700  3.5625  2.2771  11.2450  127
instl  27.5613  20.5500  28.9836  2.5600  281.2900  4.9430  40.7241  150
gini3  40.2806  38.7100  10.0334  24.5100  65.0000  0.5903  2.4915  144
Africa  0.1789  0.0000  0.3840  0.0000  1.0000  1.6748  3.8049  257
Latinca  0.1484  0.0000  0.3562  0.0000  1.0000  1.9776  4.9111  256
c  b9094  0.2908  0.1700  0.3196  0.0000  0.8700  0.5881  1.7521  157
c  b7579  0.2068  0.0000  0.3194  0.0000  0.8800  1.1242  2.4965  137
Setmort  227.6808  78.2000  440.2132  8.5500  2940.0000  4.3931  24.3029  75
Fpress  52.9623  52.0000  24.9984  0.0000  95.0000  -0.0989  1.8584  186
Pxi7O  0.7367  0.8900  0.2966  0.0400  1.0000  -1.0080  2.6183  128
T9097  15.6072  12.7375  10.1428  0.0000  56.7666  1.3795  5.5161  143
18Table 2. Correlation Matrix of the Independent Variables7
1.00
avelf  (_166_10_-_______ 
_ _
-0.13  1.00
kyor So  (166)  (205)  _  _  _  _
0.06  -0.40  1.00
kgor f  (166)  (205)  (205)  _  _  _  _
-015  -009  -0.17  1.00
kyorgye  (166)  (205)  (205)  (205)  _  _  _  _  _  _
-0.16  -0.07  -0.14  -0.03  1.00
legor  sc  (166)  (205)  (205)  (205)  (205)  _____  _
-0.51  0.01  -0.19  0.25  0.28  1.00
tnPp9195  (140)  (147)  (  147)  (147)  (147)  (147)  _  _  _
-0.42  -0.12  -0.13  0.10  0.29  0.87  1.00
snpp7680  (109)  (109)  (109)  (109)  (109)  (108)  (110)  _  . _  _  _  _
-0.38  -0.42  0.31  0.23  013  0.26  0.33  1.00
indep  (5  (184)  (184)  (184)  (184)  (144)  (107)  (188)  _  .
-0.05  0.00  -0.18  -0.07  -0.04  0.30  0.14  -027  1.00
ops9798  (140)  (158)  (158)  (158)  (158)  (135)  (104)  (156)  (160)  1
-008  -0.14  -023  -0.04  -0.04  029  0.14  -0.31  0.96  1.00
ops8497  (126)  (126)  (126)  (126)  (126)  (120)  (104)  (125)  (127)  (127)  _  . _  .
-0.10  -0.10  0.02  0.01  -0.01  0.26  0.18  -0.15  0.49  0 55  1.00
tnstl  .(19)  (150)  (150)  (150)  (150)  (132)  (108)  (147)  (132)  (123)  (150)
0.23  -0.37  0.23  -0.18  -0 16  -0.32  -0.27  0.03  0.01  0 05  -.13  1.00
8ini3  (126)  (141)  (141)  (141)  (141)  (117)  7)  (138)  (131)  (110)  (125)  (144)  _
0.55  -0.24  0.18  -0.10  -0.09  -0.57  -0.47  -0.14  -0.06  -0.06  -0.06  0.37  1.00
africa  (166)  (205)  (205)  (205)  (205)  (147)  (110)  (188)  (159)  (126)  (150)  (143)  (257)
-0.30  -0.21  0.20  -0.09  -0.07  0.04  0.01  0.20  0.00  0.02  0.03  0.31  -0.20  1.00
atinca  6(1)  (205)  (205)  (205)  (205)  (147)  (110)  (188)  (159)  (126)  (150)  (143)  (256)  (256)  -
-0.39  -. 15  -0.11  0.28  0.28  0.65  0.55  0.41  0.04  -0.02  0.07  -0.21  -0.36  0.16  1.00
c b9094  4  (152)  (152)  (152)  (152)  (125)  (99)  (151)  (137)  (113)  (128)  (129)  (156)  (156)  (7
-0.32  -0.24  -0.17  0.21  0.36  0.68  0.63  0.39  0.10  0.08  0.16  -0.24  -0.34  0.02  0.83  1.00
c b7579  (133)  (133)  (133)  (3117  (99)  (132)  (120)  (112)  (125)  (114)  (136)  (136)  (137)  (137)L-
0.40  -0.05  001  -0  41  -0.36  -0.28  -0.06  -0 04  0.04  0.05  0.48  -0.2  -0.27  -0.23  1.00
setnort  Q3)  (73)  (73)  . . (68)  (63)  (73)  (70)  (66)  (72)  (70)  (75)  (75)  (68)  (67)  (75)
-0.29  -0  19  -0.14  0.22  0.25  0.52  0 39  0.20  0.11  0 13  0.19  -0.16  -0.25  0.26  0.73  0.64  -0 12  1  .00
fpres  (160)  (184)  (184)  (184)  (184)  (145)  (107)  (181)  (156)  (125)  (147)  (138)  (186)  (186)  (152)  (133)  (72)  (16
.0.34  -0.09  0 28  -0.42  -0.17  -0 52  -0.30  -0 30  -0.20  -0.24  -0.15  0.31  0.29  0.14  -0.55  -0.55  0.22  -0  44  1.00
pxi7  0  (126)  (127)  (127)  (127)  (127)  (115)  (99)  (126)  (113)  (122)  (106)  (128  1)  (113)  (112)  (69)  (j26  (128)
0.24  -0.14  0.06  -0.17  -0.18  -0.56  -0.54  -0.15  -028  -0.26  -0.19  0.12  0.30  -0  01  -0.36  -0.39  0.06  -0.31  0 27  0
t9097  (135)  (143)  (143)  (143)  (143)  (126)  (102)  (142)  (131)  (131)  (129)  (122)  (143)  (143)  (127)  (118)  (70)  /1-1  (114)  (1
The number of observations used in each pair wise calculation  is included in parenthesis.
19Table 3a. DATA SET: Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton
Preferred specification  With region dummies
How  authorities are  selected  and  Capacity  of the  state to implof  the  state and the  How authorities  are  selected  and  Capacity  of the state  to  iplemeint  Respect of the state and the
replaced  sound policies  citizens  for the rules  replaced  sound  policies  citizens  for the rules
Voice  anid  Political  Goverunmnt  RegLilatory  Rule of Law  Graft  Voice and  Political  Government  Regulatory  Rule of Law  Graft
Accountability  Instability and  Effectiveness  Burden  Accountability  Instability and  Effectiveness  Burdets
Violence  _________  Violence  - -- 42-
Ettuso-linguistic  -0.138  0.233  0.257  -0.205  0.067  0.084  -0.154  0.080  0.053  -0.043  -0.291  -0.298
Fractionalization  (-0.51)  (0.83)  (1.10)  (-1.22)  (0.26)  (0.38)  (-0.47)  (0.22)  (0.21)  (-0.25)  (-I.19)  (-1.29)
Socialist Legal  -0.232  0.119  -0.573  -0.477  -0.554  -0.751  -0.274  0.140  -0.610  -0.441  -0.571  -0.767
Code  (-1.09)  (0.52)  (-2.13)  (-1.80)  (-2.95)  (-3.67)  (-0.96)  (0.57)  (-2.12)  (-1.70)  (-3.00)  (-3.44)
Frenich Legal  -0.171  -0.251  -0.138  -0.161  -0.331  -0.419  -0.224  -0.262  -0.093  -0.209  -0.296  -0.377
Code  (-1.28)  (-1.65)  (-1.02)  (-1.63)  (-2.61)  (-3.23)  (-1.57)  (-1.64)  (-0.70)  (-2,08)  (-2.31)  (-3.19)
German Legal  -0.063  0.190  0.090  -0.432  0.247  -0.215  0.044  0.130  0.019  -0.377  0.109  -0.354
Code  (0.32)  (0.94)  (0.40)  (-2.67)  (1.26)  (-0.76)  (0.23)  (0.66)  (0.08)  (-2.58)  (0.63)  (-1.30)
Scandinavian  0.432  0.521  0.554  -0.115  0.483  0.715  0.398  0.448  0.486  -0.065  0.338  0.567
Legal Code  (2.49)  (2.66)  (2.87)  (-0.74)  (2.88)  (3.37)  (2.39)  (2.38)  (2.67)  (-0.45)  (2.25)  (2.97)
PPPGNP  0.432  0.352  0.415  0.338  0.476  0.452  0.484  0.392  0.397  0.358  0.498  0.474
Average  91-95  (4.93)  (3.69)  (5.07)  (4.83)  (6.14)  (5.81)  (5.88)  (4.10)  (4.58)  (5.07)  (6.14)  (5.97)
Years since  0.105  0.244  0.188  0.119  0.122  0.149  0.095  0.246  0.214  0.096  0.158  0.182
Independence  (1.02)  (2.26)  (2.25)  (1.57)  (1.41)  (2.07)  (0.96)  (2.36)  (2.41)  (1.38)  (1.84)  (2.39)
(X+M)/GDP  .103  0.313  0.410  -0.070  0.395  0.495  0.071  0.244  0.355  -0.026  0.265  0.360
Average 96-97  (0.52)  (1.44)  (2.46)  (-0.50)  (2.75)  (3.09)  (0.40)  (1.31)  (2.34)  (-0.20)  (2.10)  (2.57)
Gini Coefficient  -0.007  -0.013  -0.016  0.000  -0.014  -0.014  -0.013  -0.015  -0.011  -0.005  -0.009  -0.010
(-1.27)  (-1.74)  (-2.75)  (0.05)  (-2.38)  (-2.43)  (-1.71)  (-1.84)  (-1.59)  (-1.01)  (-1.52)  (-1.43)
Africa  0.259  0.228  -0.024  0.055  0.202  0.211
(1.09)  (0.88)  (-0.12)  (0.35)  (1.04)  (1.16)
Latin America  0.263  0.001  -0.372  0.348  -0.404  -0.412
(1.15)  (0.00)  (-1.95)  (2.60)  (-2.31)  (-2.42)
Constant  -3.389  -3.585  -3.693  -2.737  -3.882  -3.807  -3.610  -3.803  -3.683  -2.741  -4.144  -4.033
(-4.47)  (-4.55)  (-5.04)  (-5.33)  (-5.29)  (-5.74)  (-4.95)  (-4.32)  (4.84)  (-5.40)  (-5.19)  (-6.18)
#  obs  105  101  102  104  104  101  105  101  102  104  104  10l
R'  0.56  0.55  0.64  0.55  0.70  0.71  0.57  0.56  0.67  0.58  0.74  0.75
Hausman Test
20Table 4. DATA  SET: Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton
With checks  and balances  With freedom of the press
How authorities  are selected and  Capacity  of the state to implement  Respect of  the state and the  How authonities are selected and  Capacity of the state to implement  Respect of the state and the
replaced  sound policies  citizens  for the rules  replaced  sound policies  citizens for the rules
Voice and  Political  Govemmeiit  Regitlatory  Rule of Law  Graft  Voice and  Political  Government  Regulatory  Rule of Law  Graft
Accountability  histability and  Effectiveness  Burden  Accountability  Instability  and  Effectiveness  Burden
Violence  Violence
Ethno-linguistic  -0.017  0324  0.297  -0.156  0.168  0.135  -0.149  0.239  0.263  -0.217  0.062  0.093
Fractionalization  (-0.07)  (1.15)  (1.29)  (-0.89)  (0.66)  (0.62)  (-1.06)  (0.84)  (1.09)  (-1.32)  (0.22)  (0.41)
Socialist Legal  -0.195  0.206  -0.505  -0.452  -0.508  -0.673  -0.105  0.236  -0.526  -0.392  -0.483  -0.709
Code  (-1.09)  (0.97)  (-1.78)  (-1.74)  (-2.75)  (-3.15)  (-0.90)  (1.00)  (-1.92)  (-1.56)  (-2.51)  (-3.45)
French Legal  -0.050  -0.152  -0.070  -0.135  -0.292  -0.344  -0.093  -0.197  -0.119  -0.117  -0.305  -0.407
Code  (-0.41)  (-1.04)  (-0.51)  (-1.33)  (-2.33)  (-2.74)  (-1.23)  (-1.43)  (-0.90)  (-1.25)  (-2.63)  (-3.25)
German Legal  0.124  0.280  0.166  -0.402  0.289  -0.131  -0.154  0.097  0.038  -0.468  0.176  -0.285
Code  (0.70)  (1.53)  (0.79)  (-2.44)  (1.54)  (-0.49)  (-1.48)  (0.54)  (0.18)  (-2.92)  (0.98)  (-1.08)
Scandinavian  0.420  0.574  0.613  -0.094  0.512  0.784  -0.022  0.304  0.445  -0.226  0.335  0.586
Legal  Code  (0.87)  (3.12)  (3.18)  (-0.61)  (3.29)  (3.90)  (-0.24)  (1.71)  (2.41)  (-1.51)  (2.02)  (2.77)
PPP GNP  0.183  0.204  0.332  0.298  0.416  0.364  0.187  0.230  0.363  0.249  0.396  0.401
Average 91-95  (2.11)  (1.87)  (3.15)  (3.46)  (4.90)  (3.90)  (4.17)  (2.41)  (4.31)  (3.41)  (4.94)  (5.27)
Years since  0.030  0.206  0.176  0.103  0.108  0.141  -0.002  0.183  0.162  0.080  0.087  0.124
Independence  (0.46)  (2.23)  (2.17)  (1.49)  (1.27)  (1.96)  (-0.04)  (1.96)  (1.91)  (1.31)  (0.97)  (1.63)
(X+M)/GDP  0.259  0.414  0.485  -0.052  0.459  0.588  0.043  0.272  0.395  -0.100  0.375  0.482
Average 96-97  (1.55)  (2.04)  (2.67)  (-0.34)  (2.98)  (3.45)  (0.30)  (1.46)  (2.22)  (-0.67)  (2.39)  (2.86)
Gini Coefficient  -0.004  -0.012  -0.015  0.000  -0.013  -0.013  -0.004  -0.011  -0.015  0.000  -0.013  -0.012
(-0.84)  (-1.60)  (-2.65)  (0.06)  (-2.29)  (-2.25)  (-1.34)  (-1.65)  (-2.64)  (0.21)  (-2.36)  (-2.27)
Checks and  1.482  0.811  0.401  0.220  0.343  0.419
Balances  (5.41)  (2.48)  (1.23)  (0.92)  (1.35)  (1.37)
Freedom of the  0.029  0.015  0.006  0.009  0.009  0.007
Press  (16.26)  (3.39)  (2.02)  (3.09)  (2.77)  (2.57)
Constant  -1.932  -2.755  -3.277  -2.468  -3.591  -3.411  -2.720  -3.291  -3.598  -2.402  -3.659  -3.754
(-2.86)  (-3.52)  (-4.07)  (-4.59)  (-4.93)  (-4.79)  (-7.16)  (-4.05)  (4.89)  (-4.89)  (-4.64)  (-5.26)
fobs  102  98  99  101  101  98  104  100  101  103  103  100
R  2  0.69  0.58  0.65  0.55  0.71  0.71  0.89  0.63  0.66  0.60  0.73  0.73
Hausman  Test
21Table  5. DATA SET: ICRG, Average  over the period 1984-1997
Preferred Specification  With regional dummics
ICRG  Coouptit  Rule of Law  Bureaucracy  Contract  Expropiation  ICRG  Corruption  Rule of Law  Bureaucracy  Contract  Expropiation
Quality  Repudiation  Risk  Quality  Repuidiation  Risk
Eti.olingui,stic  0.391  0.322  0.208  0.864  0.167  0.229  -0.343  -0.796  -0.830  -0.321  -0,055  -0.200
Fractionalization  (1.16)  (0.57)  (0.41)  (1.68)  (0.54)  (0.80)  (-1.17)  (-1.61)  (-1.91)  (-0.75)  (-0 14)  (-0.56)
Socialist Legal  0.162  0.420  0.446  -0.124  0.039  0.274  -0.358  -0.176  -0.202  -0.866  -0.348  -0.092
Code  (0.68)  (1.01)  (1.25)  (-0.33)  (0.17)  (0.99)  (-1.55)  (-0.36)  (-0.57)  (-2.89)  (-1.74)  (-0.32)
FreuichLegal  -0.163  -0.451  -0.514  -0.895  -0.515  -0.606  -0.479  -0.317  -0.357  -0.714  -0.394  -0.506
Code  (-3.87)  (-1.83)  (-2.23)  (-3.68)  (-3.76)  (-4.45)  (-3.58)  (-1.38)  (-1.66)  (-3.63)  (-3.21)  (-3.79)
German Legal  0.512  0.361  0.616  0.688  0.667  0.335  0.216  -0.036  0.221  0.237  0.515  0.145
Code  (2.29)  (1.22)  (2.13)  (2.10)  (2.47)  (1.54)  (1.08)  (-0.13)  (0.79)  (0.90)  (2.03)  (0.67)
Scandinavian  0.592  1.234  0.954  0.620  0.300  0.185  0.345  0.860  0.606  0.223  0.224  0.040
LegalCode  (2.39)  (3.56)  (2.77)  (1.77)  (1.52)  (0.82)  (1.45)  (2.55)  (1.79)  (0.69)  (1.15)  (0.17)
PPP GNP  0.721  0.733  0.806  1.006  0.642  0.515  0.660  0.692  0.743  0.933  0.564  0.463
Average 91-95  (6.44)  (3.68)  (4.83)  (6.21)  (6.44)  (4.26)  (6.98)  (3.24)  (4.48)  (7.70)  (6.56)  (4.26)
Years since  0.429  0.497  0.485  0.438  0.404  0.393  0.568  0.683  0.670  0.649  0.476  0.482
Independence  (3.68)  (2.70)  (2.85)  (2.31)  (3.98)  (3.48)  (6.18)  (4.43)  (4.77)  (4.81)  (5.10)  (4.25)
(X+M)/GDP  0.508  0.802  0.639  0.450  0.367  0.399  0.403  0.619  0.480  -0.269  0.362  0.344
Average  96-97  (2.36)  (3.33)  (2.63)  (1.36)  (1.78)  (2.33)  (2.38)  (3.02)  (2.51)  (1.00)  (2.23)  (2.51)
GiniCoefficient  -0.018  -0.011  -0.022  -0.019  -0.021  -0.020  0.000  0.005  -0.001  0.004  -0.003  -0.006
(-2.42)  (-0.90)  (-2.02)  (-1.76)  (-3.39)  (-2.77)  (0.03)  (0.39)  (-0.13)  (0.38)  (-0.52)  (-0.77)
Africa  0.070  0.461  0.258  0.290  -0.393  -0.069
(0.32)  (1.35)  (0.74)  (0.87)  (-1.70)  (-0.26)
Latin Arnerica  -1.117  -1.272  -1.386  -1.588  -0.844  -0.788
(-6.71)  (4.08)  (-4.88)  (-6.27)  (-4.93)  (-4.97)
Constant  -2.599  -3.924  -3.694  -4.956  -1.433  -0.174  -2.987  -4.462  -4.219  -5.556  -1.615  -0.418
(-3.05)  (-2.17)  (-2.69)  (-3.99)  (-1.90)  (-0.23)  (-3.79)  (-2.49)  (-3.02)  (-5.43)  (-2.31)  (-0.57)
#  obs  84  84  84  84  84  84  84  84  84  84  84  84
R
2 0.75  0.60  0.66  0.66  0.77  0.72  0.86  0.73  0.76  0.79  0.82  0.79
Hausman Test
22Table 6.  DATA SET: ICRG, Average over the period 1984-1997
With checks  and balances  With freedom of the press
ICRG  Corruption  Rule  of Law  Bureaucracy  Contract  Expropiation  ICRG  Corruption  Rule of Law  Bureaucracy  Contract  Expropiation
Quality  Repudiation  Risk  Quality  Repudiation  Risk
Ethnolinguistic  0.475  0.437  0.336  0.963  0.230  0.287  0.450  0.422  0.339  0.926  0.213  0.260
Fractionalizatioi,  (1.55)  (0.84)  (0.77)  (1.98)  (0.75)  (1.09)  (1.33)  (0.78)  (0.68)  (1.80)  (0.68)  (0.90)
Socialist Legal  0.594  0.952  1.127  0.421  0.337  0.643  0.513  1.004  1.202  0.259  0.298  0.471
Code  (2.36)  (2.45)  (2.88)  (0.95)  (1.20)  (2.52)  (1.61)  (1.86)  (2.27)  (0.49)  (0.98)  (1.51)
French Legal  -0.328  -0.084  -0.057  -0.537  -0.310  -0.371  -0.566  -0.361  -0.386  -0.855  -0.469  -0.591
Code  (-2.00)  (-0.35)  (-0.24)  (-2.00)  (-2.00)  (-2.77)  (-3.97)  (-1.51)  (-1.70)  (-3.75)  (-3.35)  (4.55)
Genran Legal  0.661  0.564  0.858  0.863  0.783  0.440  0.450  0.277  0.524  0.604  0.639  0.283
Code  (2.61)  (2.25)  (2.97)  (2.38)  (2.50)  (1.67)  (2.03)  (0.91)  (1.72)  (1.83)  (2.41)  (1.31)
Scandinavian  0.626  1.305  1.015  0.643  0.342  0.181  0.480  1.069  0.759  0.480  0.238  0.103
Legal Code  (3.19)  (4.42)  (3.67)  (2.11)  (2.06)  (1.01)  (1.90)  (2.99)  (2.16)  (1.30)  (1.23)  (0.46)
PPP GNP  0.454  0.404  0.398  0.664  0.466  0.286  0.691  0.684  0.742  0.973  0.621  0.498
Average 91-95  (4.16)  (1.91)  (2.32)  (4.00)  (4.22)  (2.11)  (6.53)  (3.46)  (4.91)  (6.36)  (6.25)  (4.14)
Years  since  0.297  0.339  0.273  0.269  0.314  0.275  0.358  0.376  0.327  0.362  0.350  0.355
Independence  (2.45)  (1.80)  (1.60)  (1.29)  (2.69)  (2.64)  (2.58)  (1.65)  (1.53)  (1.65)  (2.89)  (2.84)
(X +  M) /  GDP  0.417  0.699  0.477  0.336  0.299  0.312  0.458  0.710  0.511  0.404  0.321  0.379
Average 96-97  (2.22)  (3.20)  (2.15)  (1.11)  (1.50)  (2.07)  (2.37)  (3.23)  (2.12)  (1.31)  (1.58)  (2.27)
Gini Coefficient  -0.014  -0.007  -0.017  -0.014  -0.019  -0.016  -0.017  -0.010  -0.022  -0.018  -0.021  -0.019
(-2.15)  (-0.59)  (-1.79)  (-1.41)  (-3.15)  (-2.59)  (-2.47)  (-0.89)  (-2.06)  (-1.72)  (-3.45)  (-2.73)
Checks  and  1.228  1.475  1.886  1.586  0.800  1.091
Balances  (5.01)  (3.70)  (4.82)  (3.88)  (2.83)  (4.34)
Freedom of the  0.007  0.011  0.014  0.007  0.004  0.004
Press  (1.55)  (1.67)  (1.94)  (1.13)  (1.27)  (1.10)
Constant  -0.795  -1.728  -0.883  -2.657  -0.222  1.392  -2.515  -3.754  -3.445  -4.895  -1.341  -0.157
(-0.92)  (-0.92)  (-0.64)  (-1.94)  (-0.25)  (1.55)  (-3.03)  (-2.11)  (-2.55)  (4.02)  (-1.70)  (-0.20)
#  obs  82  82  82  82  82  82  83  83  83  83  83  83
R'  0.81  0.66  0.74  0.71  0.79  0.78  0.76  0.62  0.68  0.67  0.77  0.73
Hausman Test
23Table 7. Regressions with tariffs without openness  (OLS)
DATA SET: Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton  DATA SET: ICRG, Averaged over the period 1984-1997
How auithorities  are selected  anid  Capacity of the state to implement  Respect of the state and the
replaced  souind policies  citizens for  the rules
Voice  and  Political  Goverunment  Regullatory  Rule of Law  Graft  ICRG  CorrLiptioll  Rule of Law  ButeaLicracy  Conltract  Expropriationi
Accouiitability  Itstability aitd  Effectiveness  Burrdeni  Quality  Reptidiation  Risk
Violeiice
Etluio-linguistic  -0.228  0.156  0.081  -0.268  -0.054  -0.085  0.282  0.213  0.012  0.752  0.018  0.165
Fractionalizatioii  (-0.882)  (0.570)  (0.396)  (-1.895)  (-0.210)  (-0.466)  (0.916)  (0.452)  (0.026)  (1.569)  (0.053)  (0.559)
Socialist Legal  -0.282  0.075  -0.711  -0.242  -0.551)  -0.939  0.420  0,580  0.748  0.119  0.325  0.625
Code  (-0.946)  (0.286)  (-2.623)  (-I 782)  (-2.480)  (-4.525)  (1.415)  (1.549)  (1.716)  (0.264)  (1.004)  (2.295)
French Legal  -0.222  -0.282  -0.259  -0.153  -0.355  -0.589  -0.684  -0.737  -0.648  -0.893  -0.533  -0.589
Code  (-1.454)  (-1.483)  (-1.966)  (-1.485)  (-2.610)  (-5.162)  (-4.390)  (-3.313)  (-2.630)  (-3.618)  (-3.381)  (-4.289)
GennaisLegal  -0.260  0.098  -0.137  -0.403  0.156  -0.514  0.307  -0.216  0.320  0.618  0.571  0.257
Code  (-0.144)  (0.484)  (-0.656)  (-2.825)  (0.880)  (-2.030)  (1.595)  (-0.825)  (0.934)  (1.970)  (2.193)  (1.252)
Scandinaviani  0.329  0.413  0.300  -0.089  0.378  0.390  0.368  0.813  0.641  0.452  0.142  0.038
Legal Code  (2.203)  (2.380)  (2.148)  (-0.737)  (2.951)  (2.467)  (1.876)  (3.208)  (2.221)  (1.456)  (0.808)  (0.208)
PPPGNP  0.397  0.374  0.386  0.242  0.489  0.441  0.679  0.415  0.731  1.094  0.668  0.549
Average91-95  (5.009)  (3.655)  (5.663)  (4.516)  (5.958)  (6.945)  (5.451)  (1.893)  (3.668)  (6.043)  (4.840)  (4.285)
Years since  0.072  0.180  0.104  0.111  0.049  0.066  11.291  0.387  0.281  0.305  0.258  0.231
Independence  (0.863)  (1.940)  (1.424)  (2.171)  (0.610)  (1.082)  (2.542)  (2.300)  (1.571)  (1.640)  (2.067)  (2.357)
Giii  Coefficietit  -0.009  -0.012  -0.018  -0.001  -0.012  -0.017  -0.021  -0.022  -0.026  -0.020  -0.022  -0.021
(-1.562)  (-1.507)  (-2.951)  (-0.221)  (-1.908)  (-3.004)  (-2.815)  (-1.907)  (-2.141)  (-1.732)  (-3.227)  (-2.833)
Nominal Tariffs  -0.011  -0.008  -0.020  -0.011  -0.008  -0.019  -0.022  -0.051  -0.029  -0.009  -0.014  -0.015
Average 90-97  (-1.329)  (-1.063)  (-3.564)  (-2.580)  (-1.166)  (-4.062)  (-2.409)  (-4.297)  (-2.650)  (-0.730)  (-1.337)  (-1.578)
Constant  -2.556  -3.121  -2.253  -1.716  -3.257  -2.383  -0.766  0.881  -1.021  -4.489  -0.404  0.884
(-2.742)  (-3.023)  (-2.883)  (-3.143)  (-3.627)  (-3.424)  (-0.696)  (0.455)  (-0.548)  (-2.692)  (-0.303)  (0.727)
#  obs  106  103  104  105  105  103  83  83  83  83  83  83
R  2  0.5767  0.5285  0.6658  0.5886  0.6806  0.7589  0 7450  0.6596  0.6479  0.6556  0.7155  0.6899
24Table 8. Regressions with tariffs and openness (TSLS)
DATA SET: Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton  DATA SET: ICRG, Averaged over the period 1984-1997
How authorities  are selected and  Capacity of the state to implement  Respect of the state and the
replaced  sound policies  citizens for the rules
Voice  and  Political  Government  Regulatory  Rule of Law  Graft  ICRG  Corruption  Rule of Law  Bureaucracy  Contract  Expropriation
Accountability  Inistability  and  Effectiveness  Burden  Quality  Repudiation  Risk
Violence
Ethno-linguistic  -0.218  0.230  0.175  -0.266  0.056  -0.030  0.360  0.176  0.175  0.851  0.169  0.260
Fractionalizaton  (-0.811)  (0.805)  (0.773)  (-1.766)  (0.215)  (-0.145)  (1.070)  (0.331)  (0.347)  (1.619)  (0.521)  (0.900)
Socialist Legal  -0.277  0.117  -0.647  -0.250  -0.464  -0.824  0.284  0.499  0.583  -0.036  0.156  0.488
Code  (-0.893)  (0.503)  (-2.313)  (-1.821)  (-2.281)  (-3.880)  (1.164)  (1.228)  (1.479)  (-0.089)  (0.607)  (2.158)
French Legal  -0.224  -0.253  -0.218  -0.164  -0.296  -0.500  -0.611  -0.578  -0.520  -0.841  -0.498  -0.546
Code  (-1.546)  (-1.498)  (-1.649)  (-1.729)  (-2.118)  (-4.241)  (-3.703)  (-2.231)  (-2.090)  (-3.299)  (-3.476)  (-4.337)
German Legal  0.001  0.188  -0.020  -0.403  0.303  -0.333  0.460  0.075  0.529  0.741  0.655  0.358
Code  (0.004)  (0.870)  (-0.090)  (-2.680)  (1.421)  (-1.221)  (1.881)  (0.213)  (1.502)  (2.022)  (2.255)  (1.565)
Scandinavian  0.363  0.518  0.436  -0.086  0.545  0.592  0.521  1.067  0.904  0.579  0.255  0.147
Legal Code  (1.871)  (2.474)  (2.202)  (-0.607)  (2.892)  (2.847)  (2.028)  (2.941)  (2.402)  (1.539)  (1.191)  (0.657)
PPPGNP  0.368  0.342  0.351  0.228  0.460  0.395  0.725  0.518  0.727  1.134  0.675  0.579
Average 91-95  (4.057)  (3.050)  (4.433)  (3.575)  (5.213)  (5.237)  (5.681)  (2.068)  (3.460)  (5.920)  (5.637)  (4.827)
Years since  0.093  0.243  0.177  0.117  0.137  0.146  0.384  0.482  0.444  0.395  0.359  0.312
Independence  (0.924)  (2.289)  (2.133)  (1.756)  (1.635)  (2.017)  (3.016)  (2.385)  (2.286)  (1.858)  (2.941)  (3.093)
Gini Coefficient  -0.010  -0.014  -0.019  -0.001  -0.013  -0.016  -0.018  -0.015  -0.023  -0.018  -0.022  -0.020
(-1.554)  (-1.635)  (-3.002)  (-0.280)  (-2.092)  (-2.702)  (-2.362)  (-1.156)  (-1.870)  (-1.511)  (-3.072)  (-2.536)
Nominal Tariffs  -0.010  -0.002  -0.013  -0.011  0.002  -0.011  -0.006  -0.026  -0.012  0.006  -0.003  -0.003
Average 90-97  (-1.154)  (-0.229)  (-2.025)  (-2.545)  (0.254)  (-1.836)  (-0.646)  (-1.667)  (-1.016)  (0.409)  (-0.286)  (-0.357)
(M+XYGDP  0.069  0.315  0.339  -0.002  0.458  0.419  0.436  0.714  0.599  0.380  0.306  0.321
Average 97-98  (0.328)  (1.409)  (2.013)  (-0.013)  (3.031)  (2.790)  (1.701)  (2.193)  (2.018)  (1.033)  (1.234)  (1.795)
Constant  -2.453  -3.459  -2.669  -1.597  -3.951  -2.908  -2.237  -1.561  -2.663  -5.810  -1.365  -0.213
(-2.600)  (-3.433)  (-3.092)  (-2.885)  (-4.440)  (-3.569)  (-1.820)  (-0.630)  (-1.353)  (-3.012)  (-1.029)  (-0.192)
#obs  102  99  100  101  101  99  81  81  81  81  81  81
0.5708  0.5461  0.6717  0.5885  0.6889  0.7423  0.7650  0.6301  0.6583  0.6679  0.7700  0.7321
25Table 9a. Regressions with the Sachs-Warner  index without openness (OLS)
DATA SET: Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton  DATA SET: ICRG, Averaged over the period  1984-1997
How authorities  are selected and  Capacity of the state to impleineit  Respect of the state and the
replaced  sotnd policies  citizeos for  the rules
Voice  aiid  Political  Govenunienit  Regulatory  Rule  of Law  Giaft  ICRG  CorTUption  Rule of Law  Bureaucracy  Contract  Expropriation
Accountability  histability  anid  Effectiveness  Burden  Quality  Repudiation  Risk
Violence-
Etluno-Iinguistic  -0.310  -0.092  -0.017  -0.247  -0.079  -0.118  0.120  -0.018  -0,181  0.537  -0.043  0.023
Fractionalization  (-1.150)  (-0.373)  (-0.077)  (-1.616)  (-0.300)  (-0.557)  (0.365)  (-0.032)  (-0.376)  (1.099)  (-0.139)  (0.078)
Socialist Legal  -0.624  0.599  0.146  -0.218  0.127  -0.126  0.632  0.821  1.332  0.467  0.507  0.718
Code  (-0.846)  (2.072)  (0,682)  (-0.843)  ((0.545)  (-0.595)  (2.161)  (-1.698)  (3.232)  (1.093)  (1.770)  (2.067)
French Legal  -0,268  -0.336  -0.188  -0.188  -0.365  -0.462  -0.544  -0.453  -0.330  -0.769  -0.429  -0.531
Code  (-1.795)  (-1.872)  (-1.428)  (-1.658)  (-2.880)  (-3.570)  (-3.127)  (-1.676)  (-1.373)  (-3.027)  (-2.820)  (-3.197)
GerTnan Legal  -0.036  0.036  -0.130  -0.458  0.063  -0,441  0.274  0.078  0.225  0.445  0.454  0.118
Code  (-0.199)  (0.159)  (-0.525)  (-3.026)  (0.320)  (-1.437)  (1.760)  (0.273)  (0.735)  (1.757)  (2.317)  (0.721)
Scandinavian  0.354  0.372  0.347  -0.121  0.307  0.486  0.288  0.850  0.473  0.319  0.040  -0.085
Legal Code  (2.426)  (2.280)  (2.460)  (-0.916)  (2.478)  (2.908)  (1.630)  (3.218)  (2.046)  (1.111)  (0.277)  (-0.531)
PPP GNP  0.314  0.209  0.238  0.220  0,351  0.371  0.682  0.733  0.716  0.938  0.591  0.475
Average91-95  (2.957)  (1.717)  (2.600)  (2.706)  (4.006)  (4.110)  (5.604)  (3.467)  (4.372)  (5.677)  (5.601)  (3.786)
Years snce  0.141  0.175  0.102  0.148  0.031  0.029  0.147  0.173  0.031  0.123  0.157  0.148
Independence  (1.600)  (1.487)  (1.018)  (1.999)  (0.304)  (0.306)  (1.313)  (0.915)  (0.177)  (0.698)  (1.397)  (1.250)
Gini Coefficient  -0.004  -0.006  -0.008  -0.000  -0.010  -0.008  -0.005  0.002  -0.001  -0.002  -0.010  -0.010
(-0.656)  (-0.854)  (-1.365)  (-0.053)  (-1.598)  (-1.311)  (-0.663)  (0.147)  (-0.114)  (-0.227)  (-1.542)  (-1.277)
Sachs-Warner  0.301  0.609  0.900  0.272  0.711  0.684
Index  (1.178)  (2.162)  (4.252)  (1.462)  (3.158)  (3.248)
Average  82-92
Sachs-Wamer  0.840  0.817  1.485  0.994  0.803  0.772
Index  (3.624)  (2.347)  (4.728)  (2.901)  (3.509)  (3.805)
Average  66-8 1
Constant  -2.636  -2.283  -2.168  -2.010  -2.578  -2.680  -1.489  -2.630  -1.950  -3.767  -0.441  0.797
(-2.970)  (-2.805)  (-3.123)  (-4.294)  (-3.466)  (-3.988)  (-1.576)  (-1.358)  (-1.419)  (-2.869)  (-0.529)  (0.990)
#obs  95  92  93  94  94  92  82  82  82  82  82  82
R2  0.5973  0.5987  0.7273  0.6071  0.7543  0.7721  0.7948  0.6328  0.7267  0.7035  0.7897  0.7556
26Table 9b. Regressions with primary exports and openness  (TSLS)
DATA  SET: Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton  DATA  SET: ICRG, Averaged  over the period 1984-1997
How authorities  are selected and  Capacity of the state to implement  Respect of the state and the
replaced  sound  policies  citizens for the rules
Voice  and  Political  Govermment  Regulatory  Rule of Law  Graft  ICRG  Corruption  Rule of Law  Bureaucracy  Contract  Expropriation
Accountability  Instability  and  Effectiveness  Burden  Quality  Repudiation  Risk
Violence
Ethno-linguistic  -0.127  0.096  0.198  -0.155  0.048  0.028  0.429  0.384  0.310  0.865  0.237  0.251
Fractionalization  (-0.489)  (0.378)  (0.771)  (-0.896)  (0.160)  (0.124)  (1.336)  (0.726)  (0.655)  (1.677)  (0.784)  (0.933)
Socialist Legal  -0.167  0.153  -0.588  -0.187  -0.466  -0.772  0.316  0.673  0.643  0.063  0.145  0.347
Code  (-0.512)  (0.715)  (-2.241)  (-1.307)  (-2.564)  (-3.958)  (1.347)  (1.881)  (1.757)  (0.164)  (0.579)  (1.212)
French Legal  -0.089  -0.196  -0.144  -0.063  -0.275  -0.443  -0,614  -0.472  -0.495  -0.926  -0.496  -0.580
Code  (-0.591)  (-1.252)  (-1.008)  (-0.644)  (-2.031)  (-3.346)  (-3.886)  (-2.063)  (-2.194)  (-3.660)  (-3.293)  (-3.958)
German Legal  0.081  0.201  0.038  -0.349  0.261  -0.298  0.428  0.234  0.557  0.553  0.624  0.301
Code  (0.397)  (0.905)  (0.167)  (-2.381)  (1.238)  (-1.053)  (2.031)  (0.878)  (1.996)  (1.776)  (2.263)  (1.416)
Scandinavian  0.563  0.662  0.576  0.054  0.586  0.700  0.485  1.070  0.856  0.448  0.249  0.145
Legal  Code  (2.735)  (2.742)  (2.794)  (0.368)  (2.858)  (3.823)  (2.165)  (3.453)  (2.620)  (1.499)  (1.191)  (0.660)
PPP GNP  0.419  0.294  0.415  0.293  0.436  0.458  0.845  0.937  0.951  1.171  0.726  0.562
Average 91-95  (4.657)  (3.374)  (4.708)  (4.533)  (5.322)  (5.529)  (7.677)  (5.262)  (5.761)  (7.085)  (6.610)  (4.569)
Years since  0.078  0.214  0.156  0.093  0.112  0.134  0.322  0.335  0.397  0.291  0.344  0.332
Independence  (0.760)  (2.524)  (1.823)  (1.454)  (1.416)  (1.865)  (3.182)  (2.109)  (2.427)  (1.714)  (3.117)  (3.027)
Gini  Coefficient  -0.005  -0.010  -0.014  0.002  -0.014  -0.014  -0.018  -0.009  -0.023  -0.019  -0.022  -0.022
(-0.736)  (-1.381)  (-2.106)  (0.334)  (-2.200)  (-2.116)  (-2.326)  (-0.759)  (-2.090)  (-1.649)  (-3.236)  (-2.794)
(Export  fuels&  -0.007  -0.008  -0.005  -0.005  -0.005  -0.004
mmeralsyTotal  (-2.389)  (-2.343)  (-1.856)  (-2.047)  (-2.227)  (-2.244)
exports
Average  96-97
(Export  fuels&  -0.005  -0.008  -0.005  -0.007  -0.004  -0.002
minerals)yTotal  (-1.863)  (-1.960)  (-1.167)  (-1.561)  (-1.336)  (-0.925)
exports
Average 84-97  1  1
(M+X)/GDP  0.107  0.406  0.392  -0.016  0.425  0.446
Average97-98  (0.572)  (2.333)  (2.128)  (-0.117)  (2.679)  (2.601)
(M+X)/GDP  0.381  0.626  0.523  0.280  0.269  0.331
Average  84-97  (1.795)  (2.606)  (2.386)  (0.838)  (1.265)  (2.009)
Constant  -3,208  -3.025  -3.519  -2.322  -3.470  -3.658  -2.813  -4.438  -4.176  -5.199  -1.624  -0.089
(-4.381)  (-3.702)  (-4.987)  (4.921)  (.4.290)  (-5.587)  (-3.234)  (-2.591)  (-3.144)  (-4.103)  (-1.927)  (-0 111)
#obs  96  93  94  95  95  93  80  80  80  80  80  80
R
2 0.6076  0.6319  0.6789  0.5955  0.7245  0.7515  0.8068  0.6924  0.7246  0.7119  0.7847  0.7405
27Table 10. Regressions with state ownership of the press with openness (TSLS)
DATA SET: Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton  DATA SET: ICRG, Averaged over the period 1984-1997
How authiorities are selected aild  Capacity of the state to implement  Respect of the state  anid tle_
replaced  sound policies  citizens for  the rules
_  Voice  ald  Political  Goveritent  Regulatory  Rtile  of Law  Graft  [CRG  Corruption  Rule of Law  Bureaucracy  Conitract  Expropriation
Accointability  Instability  and  Effectivencss  Burden  Quality  Reptidiation  Risk
mess97_97Violence 
.
Opettness97-98  0.694  0.450  0.508  0.306  0.589  0.639  0.514  0.706  0.616  0,524  0370  0.475
(ops9
798)  (1.536)  (1,523)  (1.765)  (1.811)  (2.652)  (2.456)  (2.350)  (2138)  (1.679)  (1.684)  (1.702)  (2.218)
Ethno-linguistic  0.271  -0.138  -0.032  -0.030  -0.548  -0.124  -0.214  -0.041  -0.321  0.170  -0.564  -0.397
Fractionalizatioii  (0.789)  (-0.303)  (-0.085)  (-0.125)  (-1.646)  (-0.361)  (-0.575)  (-0.079)  (-0.501)  (0.307)  (-1.617)  (-1.166)
SocialistLregal  -0.119  0.066  -0.645  -0.396  -0.797  -0.838  -0.157  0.295  0.510  -1.027  -0.157  0.207
Code  (-0.439)  (0.226)  (-2.049)  (-1.965)  (-3.641)  (-3.486)  (-0,389)  (0.496)  (0.847)  (-1.573)  (-0.369)  (0.526)
French Legal  -0 .137  -0.386  -0.1  -0.112  -0.479  -0.483  -0.711  -0.812  -0.501  -1.092  -0.475  -0.476
Code  (-0.598)  (-1.873)  (-0.802)  (-0.955)  (-3.014)  (-2.800)  (-4.660)  (-3.676)  (-1.896)  (-4.315)  (-2.837)  (-3.067)
Gennan Legal  0.151  0 175  -0.049  -0.272  0.106  -0.387  0.200  -0.074  0.381  0.202  0.496  0.174
Code  (0.577)  (0.725)  (-0.201)  (-2.124)  (0.496)  (-1.394)  (1.143)  (0.278)  (1.223)  (0.739)  (2.393)  (0.973)
Scandinavian  0.573  0.513  0.408  0.072  0.339  0.544  0.311  0.736  0.707  0.216  0.184  0.077
Legal  Code  (2.226)  (2.053)  (1.929)  (0.477)  (1.797)  (2.567)  (1.438)  (2.573)  (2.008)  (0.673)  (0.999)  (0.358)
PPPGNP  0.319  0.239  0.396  0.181  0.308  0.447  0.640  0.781  0.789  0.898  0.504  0.390
Average9l-95  (2.607)  (1.926)  (3.435)  (2.631)  (3.194)  (4.611)  (6.623)  (4.160)  (4.337)  (6.543)  (5.258)  (3.225)
Yearssince  0.260  0.291  0.222  0.149  0.172  0.218  0.426  0.432  0.466  0.600  0.344  0.357
bIdependence  (2.214)  (2.127)  (1.950)  (1.823)  (1.635)  (2.181)  (3.666)  (2.559)  (2.524)  (3.264)  (2.765)  (2.796)
GiDiiCoefficient  -0.006  -0.008  -0.015  -0.001  -0.013  -0.013  -0.011  -0.009  -0.014  -0.007  -0.013  -0.014
(-0.783)  (-0.833)  (-1.613)  (-0.141)  (-1.627)  (-1.486)  (-1.344)  (-0.576)  (-1.053)  (-0.669)  (-1.811)  (-1.738)
State  ownership  -0.570  0.009  -0.094  -0.418  0.090  0.012  -0.083  -0.204  -0.305  0.192  -0.107  -0.200
of the press  (-2.013)  (0.034)  (-0.366)  (-2.249)  (0.411)  (0.056)  (-0.276)  (-0.438)  (-0.766)  (0.415)  (-0.337)  (-0.612)
Constant  -3.675  -2.950  -3.631  -1.783  -2.473  -4.057  -1.826  -3.485  -3.412  -4.837  -0.094  0.940
(-3.599)  (-2.050)  (-2.869)  (-2.671)  (-2.405)  (-3.729)  (-2.117)  (-1.768)  (-2.109)  (-3.854)  (-0.098)  (0.931)
#  obs  70  69  69  70  70  69  59  59  59  59  59  59
0.5745  0.5817  0.7133  0.6549  0.7467  0.7765  0.8392  0.7581  0.7448  0.7671  0.8236  0.7920
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